Jamie Trecker, the Windy City resident, writes about soccer in the USA every Wednesday.
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Just where does MLS stand in comparison to its stated goals and in relation to other American sports? In this first of a four-part series, we take a look at a league with aspirations to become one of America's major professional leagues.

DOLLARS AND CENTS

As a financial proposition, MLS is still an entity that operates in the red. MLS lost at least $300 million in its first six years (in open court during a lawsuit filed by the players, MLS admitted major losses which they pegged in excess of $110m) but may this year have broken even with expansion fees and a whopping $150m ten-year Adidas deal.

Adidas' $150m deal far eclipsed any other sponsor's interest in the league and was a shot in the arm to both the leagues' nascent development system and its credibility. MLS also helped its books greatly by axing Tampa Bay and Miami in 2002, stanching what insiders said was a $20 million annual drain.

MLS also expects a return to Spanish-language network Univision, although the league has been covered in Spanish by Fox Sports en Español, and says it will soon sign a deal with ABC/ESPN that will include rights fees.

Only one team, the Los Angeles Galaxy, is reported to be profitable but it is reasonable to suggest that New England could also be in the black given that owner Robert Kraft also controls Gillette Stadium.

AEG, the holding company owned by reclusive billionaire Philip Anschutz, once controlled six clubs in the league. It has since divested itself of two, bringing new ownership into the league with the sales of D.C. and Colorado. AEG is currently seeking to sell San Jose, leaving the Anschutz operation with the Chicago, MetroStars and Galaxy franchises.

A Decade of MLS Part 1: Dollars and Cents, the Teams Part 2: Player Quality and Development Part 3: Referees and Coaches, Stadiums Part 4: Attendance and the Media Photo Galleries... A Decade of MLS

In addition, Dave Checketts (RSL) and Jorge Vergara (Chivas USA) joined the pool. Lamar Hunt is seeking the sale of Kansas City, retaining control of FC Dallas and Columbus. As a side note, Checketts pulled out Tuesday from buying the NHL St. Louis Blues franchise, balking at the $150m price tag. Does this mean Checketts will focus exclusively on soccer? If so, this could be a big plus for the league.

Verdict: MLS no longer must answer questions about whether it can keep the doors open. In terms of money and turnover, MLS remains nowhere near the Big Four American sports, though the real question is whether it will become a financially profitable endeavor that can continue to improve its facilities and the quality of play. While talk of additional foreign investment in the league is heartening, it has to be noted that such interest in MLS has often been floated. Remember Dentsu (Japan)? Despite interest from Ajax (Holland), Barcelona (Spain) and Club America (Mexico), no checks yet have been signed.

THE TEAMS

MLS is unlike any other major pro sport in America (the WNBA nothwithstanding) due to its single-entity structure. Having survived court challenges, MLS is expected to remain a single entity indefinitely as the structure effectively controls costs. MLS never releases data on its financial transactions except when they aggrandize the league (e.g. the Adidas sponsorship) but with the formation of the MLS Players Union, comprehensive data on salaries paid to players have been made available to the media each season.

MLS still uses low-cost labor. The minimum salary is $30,000 (increasing to $34,000 in 2009) and cost control is re-inforced by a salary cap reported to be around $1.73 million. However, a fair number of young players are actually making $11,700-$16,650 a year as "developmental" players, according to documents obtained from the Players Union. In fact, 131 players make $30,000 or less base pay — a whopping 45% of the 288 players on MLS rosters (according to the MLSPU list on 7-12-05 and published the same date by industry trade paper the SportsBusiness Daily).

Chicago's exciting young prospect Chris Rolfe (who just earned his first cap for the United States against Scotland) earned a salary of $16,500 in 2005, which equaled out to a little over $2,000 for every goal he scored during the season. (Jonathan Daniel/Staff / Getty Images)

Many young players, parents and coaches alike — at least from my observation — seem confused by this salary structure and by the intricacies of the Project-40 system and the reserve league. There is no other American pro sport with rosters so complicated and so qualified by regulations.

MLS general managers across the league say it is easier to work with the league office than in the past regarding acquiring talent, but that the league office still resists transparency and retains Byzantine procedures and labels. MLS did announce this season that, as in the NFL, franchises will be able to designate and spend money on one franchise player outside of the annual salary cap. In the past, MLS has flouted the cap when it suited its needs. This move should add transparency.

One thing that doesn't get talked about — and should be of interest to most fans — is the role of the GM in MLS. Unlike other sports, MLS GMs focus almost exclusively on ticket sales. In other major leagues, the GM picks players; hires and fires coaches; hires scouts and manages a development program; and deals with ownership and league officials as a firewall for managers and players.

As a result, MLS operates much more like an entertainment conglomerate and less like a sports league. This has serious and demonstrable effects. Currently, only two GMs — the MetroStars' Alexi Lalas and L.A.'s Doug Hamilton — seem to have any real involvement in day-to-day, on-field team matters. Most MLS GMs have little or no experience in professional soccer outside of sales.

In Chicago, the massively popular Peter Wilt was fired and replaced by the largely fan-invisible, but ticket-and-sponsor-friendly John Guppy. In New York, Nick Sakiewicz was re-assigned to focus exclusively on stadium development. In Dallas, Billy Hicks was fired and replaced by Michael Hitchcock, who has been Los Angeles' VP for sales.

Verdict: While MLS is unquestionably a business, its strategy is focused on building facilities and less on players and developing the next generation of talent. Right now, the building of soccer-specific and soccer-friendly stadiums seems its primary goal.

Don't miss of Jamie Trecker's four-part series on Wednesday which focuses on the quality of play in MLS and its player development.

Jerry Trecker and Li Trecker contributed to this report. Feel free to email gripes, plaudits, tips et al to Jamie Trecker at . Due to the overwhelming volume of mail, a personal reply is not always possible, but each email is read and greatly appreciated.